

**RENEWING LOCAL DEMOCRACY**  
**THE NEXT STEPS**

**RESPONSE TO THE SCOTTISH  
EXECUTIVE'S CONSULTATION**

  
**Fairshare**  
Scotland's Campaign for Local Democracy

**23 July 2002**

# Renewing Local Democracy: The Next Steps

## Response from Fairshare Scotland's Campaign for Local Democracy

**Fairshare** welcomes the publication of the Scottish Executive's White Paper and is pleased to have the opportunity to comment on the issues raised in the consultation document that relate to electoral reform for Scotland's councils.

**Fairshare** is pleased to note the central importance the Executive has given to issues relating to the democratic mandate of local government and welcomes the Executive's continuing commitment to making progress on electoral reform in line with the principles of the Kerley Report.

**Fairshare** believes that to be fully effective, councils must be properly representative of the communities they serve and that councillors must be democratically accountable to their local electorates.

**Fairshare** agrees with the five principles recommended by the McIntosh Commission to determine the most appropriate voting system for future local government elections.

**Fairshare** also agrees with the priority the Kerley Working Group gave to the first two of those principles, ie proportionality and the councillor-ward link.

**Fairshare** strongly supports the Kerley recommendation of the Single Transferable Vote system of proportional representation (STV-PR) as the voting system that best meets the needs of local government.

The comments that follow are presented in the order of the relevant chapters, paragraphs and questions in the White Paper.

**Fairshare** has no reservations about full public disclosure of this submission.

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**Fairshare** is a cross-party organisation campaigning for the introduction of the Single Transferable Vote system of Proportional Representation (STV-PR) for Scottish local elections (see Appendix 1). The consultation White Paper poses a number of questions on which **Fairshare** has no policy as these matters are outwith its remit. The comments in this response are thus restricted to the questions on which **Fairshare** has a policy.

## **The Executive's Position**

In the White Paper the Executive reiterates its commitment to making progress on electoral reform in line with the principles of the Kerley Report and sets out the key factors Ministers will take into account when considering the introduction of a new electoral system. The White Paper also sets out the Timetable the Executive proposes to follow in taking the Next Steps process forward. **Fairshare** urges Ministers to stick to that timetable and to make real progress in implementing electoral reform for local government in Scotland.

It is now more than three-and-a-half years since the McIntosh Commission reported that it had "*found substantial and widespread support for the view that a move to some form of proportional representation (PR) would be beneficial for local government*" (Consultation Paper 2 para 115; published November 1998). This led to the recommendation that the change should be made in time for the council elections then due in 2002 (Report para 89; published June 1999). It is now more than two years since the Renewing Local Democracy Working Group made its specific recommendation of STV as the PR system that should be adopted (Kerley report para 95; published June 2000). There can be no good reason for further delay.

### **Retention of the councillor-ward link (para 32.1)**

The retention and, if possible, the enhancement of a strong, identifiable and direct link between the councillor and his or her constituents must be fundamental for local government. It is the link that gives the councillor legitimacy as an elected representative and makes him or her accountable to the local electorate. However, maintaining that link does not require single-member wards. The overwhelming majority (85%) of councillors in England are elected from multi-member wards (2 to 5 members), and there is nothing to suggest that they are any less strongly linked to their constituents than those elected from single-member wards.

Scotland is unique within the UK in now having only single-member wards for local government elections, and this arrangement is of comparatively recent origin. One effect of this has been to focus the current debate about local representation almost exclusively on the geographically defined areas that constitute the single-member wards. It is interesting that in the discussion about the new concept of community planning, there has been a recognition that there are 'communities of place' and 'communities of interests' and a recognition that these are not conveniently co-terminus (see, for example, Scottish Executive evidence to the Scottish Parliament Local Government Committee, meeting 16, 2002, COR col 2982). Rarely will any one elected member be able to represent these different communities effectively.

The strength of present link between local councillors and the electors within their geographically defined single-member wards must be questioned. Overall, almost half of those who voted in the council elections in Scotland in

May 1999 were left without a representative of their choice (1,127,158 voters, 49%). In 525 wards (45% of the 1,161 contested wards), councillors were returned without the support of even a simple majority of those who voted. In these circumstances, it is difficult to accept that there really is a strong link between the electors and these councillors.

STV-PR would not weaken the councillor-ward link. With STV-PR there would be only one kind of elected member and all would be ward representatives. The ward link would be strengthened with STV-PR because councillors would owe their positions to the support of those who had voted for them individually in the local ward. STV-PR would also strengthen the link because it maximises the number of votes that contribute to the result of an election and therefore maximises the number of voters who feel they have contributed directly to the election of a councillor.

These claims for STV-PR have been borne out in practice. Commenting on a fact-finding visit to Northern Ireland, Kenneth Gibson MSP reported that a representative of the Association of Local Authorities of Northern Ireland had emphasised that (with STV-PR) there would be no impact on the relationship between councillors and constituents. In fact, the ALANI representative said that the ward-member link was as solid under the single transferable vote system as it was under the first-past-the-post system (SP Local Government Committee meeting 32, 2000; COR col 1343). More recently, Elaine Thomson MSP reported that she had been in Ireland to watch the general elections and consider matters to do with STV. On the councillor-ward link, one of the things that struck her was that Ireland appears to have a tight link between representatives and their constituency, whether it is a three, four or five-member constituency (SP LGC meeting 15, 2002; COR col 2959).

Flexible and sensitive implementation would ensure that these benefits of STV-PR were not compromised by the imposition of inappropriately large wards in rural areas.

### **Clear reflection of voters' preferences and fair to all types of candidate (para 32.2)**

As a system of proportional representation, STV-PR will ensure that voters' preferences will be clearly reflected in the result of an election, both at ward level and across the council as a whole. Political parties and other groups would be represented in the wards and on the council in proportion to their support among those who voted. This would be a dramatic change from the present situation where the wishes of the voters are often distorted by the FPTP voting system. At ward level it is only the largest group of voters, frequently a minority, who gain representation. At council level, we have current examples where single parties have majority control with the support of only one-third of those who voted and where one party can hold 94% of the seats but have the support of only 46% of those who voted.

STV-PR will encourage parties and other groups to put up candidates wherever they have significant support because they will have a realistic chance of winning seats. This will enfranchise more electors, give more electors direct representation by a councillor of their choice and so re-connect more electors with the political process at this vital level.

Because STV-PR uniquely allows voters free choice among all the candidates within a multi-member ward, it can give PR of political parties or of other 'communities of interests' or of both, depending entirely on the preferences of the voters. The McIntosh Commission attached considerable importance to the 'communities of interests' other than political parties to which electors might belong. Some of these 'communities of interests' may be non-party or cross party boundaries, but others may exist within parties. STV-PR thus encourages parties to offer their supporters choice among their sponsored candidates so that voters can, if they wish, rank candidates on the basis of gender, religious affiliation, locality, ethnicity or policy issues.

STV-PR is a candidate-based voting system that treats all candidates alike no matter whether they are nominated by large parties, small parties or local interest groups, or they stand as independents.

**Usable throughout Scotland and responsive to the needs of urban and rural areas (para 32.2)**

STV-PR could be implemented flexibly to allow for the geographical diversity that exists across Scotland, both between and within local authorities. The numbers of members elected from each ward can be varied to suit local circumstances, with larger numbers in the more densely populated areas and smaller numbers where the population is sparse. There is, however, a trade-off between proportionality and the geographic size of the wards.

The adoption of STV-PR would make it much easier to devise wards that did not divide natural communities. With STV-PR both the numbers of electors and the numbers of elected members within wards can be varied to maintain equality of representation. This offers great flexibility in the determination of locally acceptable ward boundaries.

The Renewing Local Democracy Working Group recommended that that STV-PR should be implemented with 4-member wards, with an upper limit of 5 and a lower limit of 3, except in sparsely populated areas where, exceptionally, the lower limit might be 2 (Report para 96). It is apparent from discussions with councillors and members of political parties around Scotland that the recommendations for implementing STV-PR in this way have given cause for concern to many who will be directly affected. Some are concerned that the recommended range of ward sizes would make it difficult to meet the needs of the diverse local communities within their Local Government Areas (LGAs). Members of the smaller political parties, and members of the larger parties where they have lower levels of local support, are concerned that the implementation of STV with 4-member wards would

permanently discriminate against them. In extreme contrast, doubts have been expressed about the practicality of even a 2-member ward in the north-west part of Highland LGA.

When STV-PR was re-introduced for District Council elections in Northern Ireland in 1972, a much more flexible approach was taken (Appendix 2). The implementation of STV-PR for the Scottish Education Authorities in 1919 showed even greater flexibility (Appendix 3). Adopting a similarly flexible approach would address the concerns that have been expressed about the implementation recommended in the Kerley Report. It would also be helpful where councils want to devise schemes of multi-member wards that reflect a devolved operational structure within the LGA or where a council wished to recreate a previous burgh structure to which local electors still relate.

### **Clear support for the voting system (para 32.3)**

The Executive will find there is substantial and widespread support for the view that a change to a PR voting system would be beneficial for local government as reported by the McIntosh Commission which consulted in depth and very widely.

A poll carried out by System Three in February 2000 (Appendix 4) demonstrated that Scottish voters back a fairer voting system for electing their local councillors by a margin of almost six to one. When asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: *'Local councils would be more representative of the interests of local communities if the shares of seats won by the parties broadly reflected their shares of the votes'*, 70% of respondents said they agreed. Just 12% disagreed, while 18% said that they did not know. These views were consistent across supporters of all political parties (see Appendix 4)

The poll also asked for views on the statement: *'A voting system which encourages councillors of different parties to co-operate more is likely to lead to better local government'*. In response, exactly three-quarters of respondents (75%) agreed with the statement and just one in ten (10%) disagreed. Again, these views were consistent across supporters of all political parties. To ensure that voters were not simply agreeing with any statement put in front of them, the poll asked for views on the statement: *'We get better local government when one party gets a large majority of the seats, even if it does not have a large majority of the votes'*. Voters disagreed with this statement by around two to one.

In the Rowntree Reform Trust State of the Nation 2000 Survey, 68% of Scottish respondents strongly agreed or tended to agree with the statement *'Elections for local authorities should use a new voting system that would give parties seats on local councils in proportion to their share of the vote.'* Only 7% disagreed.<sup>1</sup>

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1. ICM Research interviewed a UK quota sample of 2,401 adults in the street between 23 - 28 October 2000

**Fairshare**, campaigning for STV-PR for councils in Scotland since January 2001, has support from members of all political parties and of none.

Experience of attempts to change the voting system in the Republic of Ireland may give an indication of the likely popularity of STV-PR once it has been introduced. STV-PR has been used to elect the government in Ireland since the passing of the Government of Ireland Act 1920. There have, however, been two attempts to change the voting system from STV-PR to FPTP when constitutional referenda were held. In 1959 Irish electors voted to keep STV-PR despite the referendum being held at the same time as a Presidential election in which the popular and successful candidate, President de Valera, had campaigned for the change. In a further constitutional referendum in 1968 there was a higher turnout when electors again voted to keep STV-PR. The Irish electors thus sent a clear message to the politicians then in government - they wished to retain the advantages that STV-PR gave them.

#### **Numbers of councillors and boundary changes (para 32.4)**

Implementation of the recommended STV-PR voting system would not require any changes in the numbers of councillors. Ministers have concluded that they do not wish to reduce the number of councillors at this time (para 8). They have, however, indicated that they will consider sympathetically any proposals by individual councils for such reductions. Where a council wishes such a reduction, STV-PR would facilitate that change because it would not be necessary to redraw boundaries for single-member wards.

For the first STV-PR elections the existing single-member wards could be amalgamated into appropriately sized multi-member wards, as was done in Northern Ireland in 1972 when STV-PR was re-introduced for local government elections there. With 26 District Councils, the whole process, including local consultations, took only three months to implement. Full advantage was taken of the flexibility of STV-PR to accommodate the needs of the diverse local communities in both the urban and rural areas.

The McIntosh Commission reported that the 1999 revision of ward boundaries had been a matter of controversy in many areas, and they formed the opinion that these controversies had centred on boundary proposals which cut across what people regarded as natural communities (Report para 86). The Commission recommended that the legislation governing the Local Government Boundary Commission for Scotland (LGBCS) should be reviewed with a view to providing greater flexibility in determining ward boundaries.

The LGBCS operates under statute and has been required to produce schemes which, as nearly as possible, have the effect that a vote in one ward has the same weight as a vote in any other ward within the same LGA; hence the need for wards within any one LGA to have approximately the same numbers of electors. Even so, there are still some very large differences among wards within some LGAs. The revision of the legislation under which the LGBCS operates, recommended by the McIntosh

Commission, will clearly be necessary if STV-PR is to be implemented with anything like the flexibility seen in Northern Ireland or in the Scottish Education Authorities' schemes.

The McIntosh Commission also said it be "an attraction" if a new electoral system could reduce such conflicts in future. There will be fewer such conflicts if LGAs are divided into fewer parcels, ie into multi-member wards. Multi-member wards would allow greater flexibility in the drawing of boundaries because the numbers of electors and the numbers of elected members within contiguous wards could both be varied to maintain equality of representation. Multi-member wards would also minimise the political significance of boundary changes because party representation would be less affected by the movement of electors between adjacent multi-member wards.

## **The Executive's Questions**

The Executive sought views on three aspects of the issues raised by its proposals for electoral reform for local government.

### **The principles recommended by the McIntosh Commission**

**Fairshare** agrees with the McIntosh Commission that the five criteria set out in its Report are the most appropriate to determine which system of proportional representation should be used for future local government elections in Scotland.

**Proportionality** is essential to ensure that most votes count and that most voters have a councillor for whom they voted. This will ensure that the seats won by groups contesting an election will be broadly proportional to the support each has within the community. 'Proportionality' must not, however, be defined solely in terms of PR of political parties and other formally registered groups. As the McIntosh Commission stated: '*The essence of the case for proportional representation is that it produces a result which more fairly represents the spectrum of opinion within the electorate*' (Report para 82). The Commission reported in its Consultation Paper 2 that many electors identified with communities defined by ethnic origin, religious affiliation and a range of common interests (para 56). Such 'communities of interests' typically cut across political party boundaries, but they are no less deserving of proportional representation if councils are properly to represent the spectrum of opinion within they electorates they serve.

**The councillor-ward link** is fundamental to the very concept of **local** government. Because of the current structure of local government in Scotland, based only on single-member wards, this link is often viewed solely in geographical terms. However, as pointed out above, this link is more appropriately seen as the link between the elected councillors and those who voted for them, ie the links with 'communities of interests' and not just with 'communities of place' defined in an arbitrary way to meet election rules. To

maintain this central link, all councillors must be elected on the same basis and all must be directly accountable to an identifiable local electorate.

**Independent councillors** play an important part in local government in many parts of Scotland and it is essential that the voting system does not discriminate against them. Equally it should not favour them at the expense of other candidates, but rather treat all candidates the same.

**Allowance for geographical diversity** is essential to ensure effective representation in both the densely populated conurbations and the sparsely populated rural areas.

**A close fit between council wards and natural communities** will help electors relate to the councils that serve them and engender a more fully participative local democracy. With any voting system based in whole or in part on single-member wards, it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid the artificial division of natural communities. These problems will be most easily overcome if the system adopted permits flexible implementation so that ward boundaries can be drawn without the need for natural communities to be divided.

In the debate since the McIntosh Report was published, some have expressed concern that too much importance has been attached to 'proportionality' and insufficient attention given to the need for 'strong government'. Proponents of this view have equated 'strong government' with single party rule. Whatever the merits of the argument for single party 'strong government' at UK level (and there are several very different definitions of 'strong government'), it has no place in local government if it can be achieved only at the expense of proper representation of the communities local councils are elected to serve.

While it is true that STV-PR, on the basis of voting patterns in the May 1999 elections, would be likely to produce single party control in only eight of the 32 councils in Scotland, those 1999 elections resulted in 13 councils (41%) having no party or group in overall control.

Furthermore, studies of councils with 'no overall control' have shown that multi-party administrations can produce benefits. Michael Temple, reporting on a such a study (Representation 1999, vol 36, pp253 – 259) concluded: *"Hung councils are typically more open and democratic than single party controlled councils and local political parties have demonstrated that they can deliver effective and stable coalition government in Britain. They provide powerful evidence that the likely result of proportional representation – a hung legislature – is not a recipe for corruption and confusion but can offer an opportunity to provide a more appropriate environment of consensus for twenty-first century British politics."* So far as local government in Scotland is concerned, that would certainly be in tune with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of electors (see Appendix 4, response to statement 3).

## **The priority the Kerley Working Group attached to the first two principles**

**Fairshare** agrees with the priority the Kerley Working Group gave to the first two of the five criteria recommended by the McIntosh Commission, ie proportionality and the councillor-ward link. It is clear from our own discussions with councillors, political activists and ordinary electors that these are the two aspects of the voting system of greatest general concern.

**Proportionality** is important to ensure that all significant views in the local community are represented. This means that proportionality must not be limited just to proportionality for registered political parties.

**Local representation** is the essence of local government, from the electors' point of view, so the link between the electors and their local councillors is important. For proportionality to be achieved, several members must be elected together. However, if the voting system ensures that each councillor elected is the personal choice of a constituency of local voters, the local link would be strengthened despite the use of multi-member wards.

## **The Kerley recommendation of STV**

**Fairshare** strongly supports this recommendation because we believe, on the basis of our own analysis, that STV-PR is the voting system that will best meet the needs of local government in Scotland. By offering electors real choice, ensuring that parties and independents are represented in fair proportion to their local support and allowing flexible implementation to match local circumstances, STV-PR will make an essential contribution to the renewal of local democracy.

## **Removing Barriers and Widening Access**

In Chapter 2 of the White Paper, Ministers have set out their proposals for implementing many of the recommendations in the Kerley Report concerning 'widening access'. While **Fairshare** has no policy on these specific recommendations (though it does support the underlying objectives), we would draw attention to an important linkage between these recommendations and the recommendation of STV-PR as the future voting system.

Institutionalised discrimination is built into the present FPTP voting system. The system forces each party to nominate only one candidate in each single-member ward. (If a party does otherwise, it risks splitting the vote and giving the seat to an opposing party.) Each party must choose the one candidate it believes will have the widest appeal to its potential supporters and so have the best chance of winning the seat. In making this choice, it is inevitable that minorities, of all kinds, will be discriminated against. This discrimination is institutionalised in the system.

In contrast, with STV-PR each party has to nominate a team of candidates in each multi-member ward. So the institutional obstacle is immediately removed. Parties can now offer their supporters a range of candidates: men and women; ethnic minorities; different religious affiliations; differing local interests. But this advantage of STV-PR goes beyond simply removing the discriminatory institutional obstacle. Because STV-PR is a preferential voting system, it positively encourages party managers to ensure that their teams of candidates do, indeed, have the widest possible appeal to their potential supporters. It is then for the voters to decide who shall be elected. If significant minorities want direct representation, they would have the power to achieve that.

The adoption of STV-PR would thus be an important step in the practical implementation of the 'widening access' agenda that the Kerley Working Group recommended and the Executive has accepted.

## Appendix 1

# **FAIRSHARE**

## **Scotland's Campaign for Local Democracy**

**Fairshare** is a cross-party organisation campaigning for the introduction of the Single Transferable Vote system of Proportional Representation (STV-PR) for Scottish local elections. Fairshare is constituted as a not-for-profit company limited by guarantee and maintains a network of Registered Supporters.

**Fairshare's Campaign Committee** includes Scottish pro-reform activists from the following organisations and political parties:

- The Scottish Conservative Party
- The Scottish Green Party
- The Scottish Labour Party
- The Scottish Liberal Democrats
- The Scottish National Party
- The Scottish Socialist Party
- Electoral Reform Society
- Charter 88 in Scotland
- The Scottish Forum for Modern Government
- The Scottish Council Foundation

**Fairshare's principal source of funding** is a grant from the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust Ltd. Additional financial support is provided by the Electoral Reform Society, Make Votes Count and individual Registered Supporters.

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## Appendix 2

### Implementation of STV-PR for District Councils in Northern Ireland

In devising the schemes of multi-member district electoral areas (DEAs) in Northern Ireland in 1972, full use was made of the flexibility of STV-PR to accommodate the different needs of the 26 District Councils and of the natural communities within them. The Electoral Law (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 (SI 1972 No. 1264 (NI 13)) specified that each local government District should be divided into DEAs constituted by grouping together not less than four and not more than eight single-member wards. The Order further specified that five, six or seven should be regarded as the desirable number of wards in any DEA unless the total number of wards in a District or geographical considerations made another number more suitable for any particular DEA.

The number of seats on the 26 District Councils ranged from 15 to 51 and the number of DEAs within any one of the 26 Districts ranged from two to eight. The table below shows the variety of arrangements adopted to accommodate local needs.

<b>District Councils in Northern Ireland 1973</b>				
<b>Number of Councillors</b>	<b>Number of DEAs within District</b>	<b>Number of District Councils</b>	<b>Number of Seats in each DEA</b>	<b>Number of District Councils</b>
15	2	1	8,7	1
	3	7	7, 4, 4	1
			6, 5, 4	2
			5, 5, 5	4
16	3	2	8, 4, 4	2
17	3	1	7, 6, 4	1
19	3	1	8, 6, 5	1
20	3	2	7, 7, 6	2
	4	4	7, 5, 4, 4	1
			6, 5, 5, 4	1
			5, 5, 5, 5	2
5	1	4, 4, 4, 4	1	
21	4	2	6, 6, 5, 4	1
			6, 5, 5, 5	1
23	4	1	7, 6, 5, 5	1
	5	1	5, 5, 5, 4, 4	1
27	5	1	6, 6, 5, 5, 5	1
30	6	1	7, 6, 5, 4, 4, 4	1
51	8	1	7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6	1

In addition to varying the numbers of seats within DEAs in the same District, there were also considerable variations in the numbers of electors per seat among DEAs in the same District. Outwith Belfast District, the average number of electors per councillor was 1,613, varying from 593 in Moyle to 2,285 in Castleragh. The variation in number of electors per seat between DEAs in the same District was less than 10% in nine Districts, between 11% and 20% in 11 Districts and 21% or more in six Districts. The smallest such variation was from -2% (1,283) to +1% (1,326) in Omagh and the largest was from -19% (1,803) to +23% (2,723) in Lisburn.

These variations reflect the practicalities of giving effective representation to electors distributed among towns and villages of various sizes and more sparsely populated rural areas within the variety of Districts in Northern Ireland.

## Appendix 3

### Implementation of STV-PR for the Scottish Education Authorities

The Single Transferable Vote system of Proportional Representation was used in Scotland to elect the members of the Education Authorities set up under the Education (Scotland) Act 1918 to replace School Boards. The initial proposal to transfer responsibility for education to the otherwise all-purpose Local Authorities, ie the then county and burgh councils, was dropped in the face of concerted public opposition. STV-PR was adopted because it was realised that the new Authorities would not succeed unless the various majority and minority interests involved in education were all fairly represented.

The 1918 Act created 38 separate Authorities based on 33 Counties and five Burghs. The 38 Authorities had a total of 987 members who were to be elected by STV from multi-member 'electoral divisions'. The table immediately below lists the Authorities as they were constituted after the first elections in 1919. There were some changes to this structure for the subsequent elections (1922, 1925, 1928), notably when the Burgh of Leith and parts of the County of Edinburgh were absorbed into the Burgh of Edinburgh in 1921; the enlarged Authority had 34 members. (The County of Edinburgh was then redesignated Midlothian and the County of Linlithgow became Westlothian.)

The pattern of implementation was unique to each Authority. All but two of the Education Authority areas were divided. The number of electoral divisions within each of the other 36 Authorities ranged from two to nine (see summary table, second below). The numbers of members elected from each of the 173 electoral divisions ranged from 3 to 10. Orkney Authority had both 10-member and 3-member divisions. Fife Authority had the most diverse arrangement, with seven electoral divisions of six different sizes: 10, 9, 9, 8, 5, 4, 3.

There was also great diversity in the relationship between the numbers of members and the population within the areas served by each Authority. (The official lists give the populations from the 1911 Census rather than numbers of electors.) The smallest population was 7,654 (Kinross) and the largest 1,009,359 (Glasgow). The smallest population per elected member was 809 (Orkney), and the largest was 22,430 (Glasgow).

Full use was made of the flexibility of STV-PR to avoid division of local communities. For example, in the Ross and Cromarty Authority, the Black Isle formed a 6-member division, while the island of Lewis was a 10-member division. The Wigtown Authority comprised two divisions: the Machars with seven members and the Rhins with ten.

Scottish Education Authorities as at 1919 Election										
Education Authority	Total Number of Members	Total Number of Divisions	Divisions Classified by Number of Members in each							
			10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3
<b>Burghs</b>										
Aberdeen	21	3				3				
Dundee	22	4				1	2			1
Edinburgh	23	5						4		1
Glasgow	45	7		1		1	4	1		
Leith	14	3						2	1	
<b>Counties</b>										
Aberdeen	46	9			1	1	1	1	5	
Argyll	35	7				1	2	1	2	1
Ayr	42	7				3	2	1	1	
Banff	30	5				2	1	2		
Berwick	16	3					2		1	
Bute	12	3						1	1	1
Caithness	18	3				1	1	1		
Clackmannan	15	2		1			1			
Dumbarton	26	5			1	1			2	1
Dumfries	23	5				1		1	2	1
Edinburgh	29	5			1	1	1	1		1
Fife	44	7		1	2	1		1	1	1
Forfar	33	7					1	3	3	
Haddington	17	3				1	1		1	
Inverness	41	9			1		1	1	4	2
Kincardine	20	4					2		2	
Kinross	9	1		1						
Kirkcudbright	22	4		1		1				2
Lanark	49	9			1		3	4		1
Linlithgow	22	3		1		1	1			
Moray	21	5					1		3	1
Nairn	10	1	1							
Orkney	32	5	1	1		1				2
Peebles	11	3							2	1
Perth	34	6		1				5		
Renfrew	35	4	1	2		1				
Ross & Cromarty	37	6	1			1	2		2	
Roxburgh	25	5			1			1	3	
Selkirk	17	3		1					2	
Shetland	24	3		2			1			
Stirling	33	5			2	1	1		1	
Sutherland	17	2		1		1				
Wigtown	17	2	1			1				
<b>Totals</b>	<b>987</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>17</b>

<b>Scottish Education Authorities as at 1919 Election</b>			
<b>Number of Divisions within Authority</b>	<b>Number of Authorities</b>	<b>Number of Members in Authority</b>	<b>Number of Seats in each Division</b>
1	2	9	9
		10	10
2	3	15	9, 6
		17	9, 8
			10, 7
3	10	11	4, 4, 3
		12	5, 4, 3
		14	5, 5, 4
		16	6, 6, 4
		17	7, 6, 4
			9, 4, 4
		18	7, 6, 5
		21	7, 7, 7
		22	9, 7, 6
4	4	24	9, 9, 6
		20	6, 6, 4, 4
		22	7, 6, 6, 3
			9, 7, 3, 3
		35	10, 9, 9, 7
5	9	21	6, 4, 4, 4, 3
		23	5, 5, 5, 5, 3
			7, 5, 4, 4, 3
		25	8, 5, 4, 4, 4
		26	8, 7, 4, 4, 1
		29	8, 7, 6, 5, 3
		30	7, 7, 6, 5, 5
		32	10, 9, 7, 3, 3
6	2	33	8, 8, 7, 6, 4
		34	9, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5
7	5	37	10, 7, 6, 6, 4, 4
		33	6, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4
		35	7, 6, 6, 5, 4, 4, 3
		42	7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 5, 4
		44	10, 9, 9, 8, 5, 4, 3
9	3	45	9, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5
		41	8, 6, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3
		46	8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4
		49	8, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 3

There were four STV-PR elections: in 1919, 1922, 1925 and 1928. The number of candidates varied from 1,897 in 1919 to 1,356 in 1928. The average electorate during this period was just under two million and the average turnout was 38%, ranging from 29% in 1919 to 44% in 1922. These turnouts compare favourably with more recent local government elections in Scotland, particularly as these STV-PR elections were for special purpose Authorities dealing only with school education.

It is clear from the results sheets published at the time that the system did not present any special problems for the electors. Despite using the X-vote (FPTP) in other local elections and in parliamentary elections, and having used the cumulative vote in the previous School Board elections, voters were well able to adapt to the use of STV for the Education Authorities and to exercise the greater freedom of choice it provided. Representation of the various groups that contested the elections was in broad proportion to their support among the voters within each division and Authority.

The use of STV-PR helped to produce stable and harmonious Education Authorities and to ensure the smooth transition of the administration of education from nearly a thousand School Boards at parish level to the much smaller number of new Authorities at the larger scale of the County and County Burgh. This use of STV ceased when responsibility for school education was transferred in 1929 from the *ad hoc* Education Authorities to the all-purpose Local Authorities.

SCOTTISH OPINION SURVEY - FEBRUARY 2000  
**ELECTORS' VIEWS ON VOTING REFORM FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
ELECTIONS IN SCOTLAND**

**Level of agreement with statements about voting systems for electing local councillors**

Statement 1

**“Local councils would be more representative of the interests of local communities if the shares of seats won by the parties broadly reflected their shares of the votes”**

	Overall	Conservative	Labour	Liberal Democrat	SNP	Other Parties	Uncommitted
Agree	70%	72%	72%	81%	74%	75%	52%
Disagree	12%	12%	13%	10%	13%	13%	8%
Don't know	18%	16%	15%	9%	13%	12%	40%

Statement 2

**“We get better local government when one party has a large majority of the seats, even if it does not have a large majority of the votes”**

	Overall	Conservative	Labour	Liberal Democrat	SNP	Other Parties	Uncommitted
Agree	28%	26%	36%	27%	31%	24%	13%
Disagree	50%	61%	47%	51%	53%	66%	40%
Don't know	22%	13%	17%	22%	16%	16%	47%

Statement 3

**“A voting system which encourages councillors of different parties to co-operate more is likely to lead to better local government”**

	Overall	Conservative	Labour	Liberal Democrat	SNP	Other Parties	Uncommitted
Agree	75%	81%	76%	88%	78%	83%	56%
Disagree	10%	10%	11%	7%	12%	8%	7%
Don't know	15%	9%	13%	5%	10%	9%	37%

Background and method: System Three interviewed 1,030 adults aged 18 and over in their homes at 40 sampling points across Scotland during the period 24 – 29 February 2000. The sample was representative of the adult population in terms of age, sex and social class. Respondents were asked which party they would vote for with their first vote in an election for the Scottish Parliament.

	Total	Conservative	Labour	Liberal Democrat	SNP	Other Parties	Uncommitted
Number	1,030	104	322	81	310	50	163