The Renewing Local Democracy Working Group (continued)

3. The Working Group’s Remit

• To consider ways in which council membership could be made attractive to a wider cross-section of the community, and councils could become more representative of the make-up of the community



• To advise on the appropriate numbers of members for each council, taking account of new management arrangements and the particular characteristics of city and rural authorities



• To advise on an appropriate system of remuneration for councillors, taking account of available resources



• To advise on the most appropriate system of election for Scottish local government

4. The Working Group’s Criteria

The Working Group was asked to recommend an electoral system based on the following criteria set by the McIntosh Commission:

i. Proportionality

The McIntosh Commission noted that in the present system votes cast for losing candidates are ‘wasted’. On average, about half of the votes at every election are wasted in this way. From this follow the well-documented problems of over-representation and under-representation of political parties. Any reasonable system of PR should ensure that the proportion of seats won by groups contesting an election should be broadly proportional to the support each has in the community.

'Proportionality' should not, however, be defined solely in terms of proportional representation of political parties and other formally recognised groups. As the Commission stated: "The essence of the case for proportional representation is that it produces a result which more fairly represents the spectrum of opinion within the electorate" (Report par. 82). It reported in Consultation Paper 2 that many electors identified with communities defined by ethnic origin, religious affiliation and a range of other common interests (par. 56). Such 'communities of interest' typically cut across political party boundaries, but are no less deserving of proportional representation if the councils are properly to represent the spectrum of opinion within the electorates they serve. Similarly, many voters wish to determine whether they are represented by men or by women.

ii. The Councillor - Ward Link

The retention and, if possible, the enhancement of a strong, identifiable and direct link between the councillor and his or her constituents must be a fundamental for local government. It is the link, which gives the councillor legitimacy as an elected representative and makes him or her accountable to the electorate.

However, maintaining such links does not require single-member wards. Even under our present ‘first-past-the-post’ system (FPTP) there are many multi-member wards in local government in England and there is nothing to suggest that, by removing a councillor's monopoly of representation in a ward, he or she will be any less strongly linked to his or her constituents.

Thus, while all systems of PR require multi-member wards, either in whole or in part, PR need not weaken such links. Indeed, it can strengthen them. While the great majority of councillors do their utmost to represent all of their constituents, whatever their political views, electors are more likely to feel strongly linked to a councillor they voted for than to one they did not. Hence in a multi-member ward more electors are likely to have a strong link with a councillor than is presently the case.

The present relationship between elected members and their electorates will inevitably change when PR is introduced. There are, however, differences in how the various systems of PR affect councillor-constituent links. Great attention must, therefore, be given to those links when recommending a PR voting system for local government.

iii. Fair provision for Independents

The McIntosh Commission attached great importance to giving independent candidates a fair chance to be elected and regarded "this criterion as essential for local government" (Report par. 84). Some systems of PR are concerned wholly or principally with PR of political parties, while others treat all candidates equally. Such differences will have to be taken into account if this criterion is to be met.

iv. Allowance for Geographical Diversity

The McIntosh Commission drew attention to the diversity among Scotland's 32 Local Authorities. They range from dense conurbations (an average of 28 electors per hectare in the City of Glasgow) to the sparsely populated Highlands and Islands (with only 0.06 electors per hectare) (Report par. 85). Clackmannanshire and Midlothian councils have only 18 members, while the Highlands and Islands has 80. Electorates range from 15,468 in Orkney to 493,033 in Glasgow. The average number of electors per councillor ranges from 730 in the Western Isles to 6,312 in Edinburgh City: average for Scotland, 3,269. Any PR system recommended for future elections must be able to accommodate these differences.

v. Close Fit between Council Wards and Natural Communities

The Local Government Boundary Commission for Scotland (LGBCS) is required to give a vote in one ward the same weight as a vote in any other ward within the same local authority: hence in each local authority it aims to produce wards with approximately the same numbers of electors. (Even so, there are still some very large differences among wards within some local authorities: e.g. 704 to 2,358 electors per ward in Argyll and Bute and 4,921 to 7,031 per ward in Glasgow.)

The McIntosh Commission reported that the 1999 revision of ward boundaries had been controversial in many areas because proposed boundaries cut across what people regarded as natural communities (Report par. 86). The Commission recommended that the legislation governing the LGBCS should be reviewed with a view to providing greater flexibility in determining ward boundaries.

The McIntosh Commission also said it would be "an attraction" if a new electoral system could reduce such conflicts. With systems which use single-member wards it is difficult to see how the LGBCS could be more flexible without increased disparities in the elector-per-councillor ratio. Multi-member wards, however, could allow greater flexibility in the drawing of boundaries because the numbers of electors and the numbers of elected members within wards could both be varied to maintain equality of representation. Multi-member wards and PR would also minimise the political significance of boundary changes because party representation would be less affected by the movement of electors between adjacent multi-member wards.